



**Report on the Investigation of the Albany  
Sound Striking East Sea Bridge  
on 30 September 2004**

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## **Glossary of Abbreviations and Acronyms**

AIS - Automatic Identification System

Collision Regulations - International Regulations for Prevention Collisions at Sea

GPS - Global Positioning System

HSC - High Speed Craft

IMO - International Maritime Organization

SOLAS - Safety of Life at Sea Convention

VHF - Very High Frequency

## 1. Summary

At about 1420 o'clock on Sep. 30<sup>th</sup> in 2004, MV "ALBANY SOUND", a bulk carrier with Hongkong China flag, collided with the East Sea Bridge on Pier PM401-B and PM402-A when passing through the safety operation area of the bridge on her way from Ningbo to Shanghai Ship Yard, with the consequence of damages of PM401-B and PM402-A, and both sides of the vessel partly depressed.

## 2. Particulars of vessel

### 2.1 Basic data

Name: ALBANY SOUND	LOA: 169.29 m
Call Sign: VRXM4	Breadth: 27.2 m
Type: Bulk Carrier	Depth: 13.6 m
Nationality: Hongkong, China	Main Power: 5850 kw
GT: 16963	Year Built: Jan. 15th , 2002
NT: 10498 t	Where Built: IMABARI SHIP YARD
DWT: 28378 t	JAPAN

IMO Number: 9260859

Main Engine Type: MAKITA-MITSUI-MAN B&W 6S42MC

The Owner: OTHELLO SHIPPING(BVI) LTD. HONGKONG

The Operator: OTHELLO SHIPPING(BVI) LTD. HONGKONG

### 2.2 Manning

There were 22 seamen on board MV "ALBANY SOUND", including captain、chief engineer、three officers、three engineers and others. It's fit with

the requirement of Minimum Manning Certificate.

According to the investigation, there were two men on the bridge when the accident happened, one being the 2<sup>nd</sup> officer and a sailor.

### **2.2.1 master**

Name: Su Maohe                      Age: 52

Maohe Su was certificated the master`s certificate in 1994, and worked as a master in the same year. March the 14<sup>th</sup> in 2003, he began to work on MV “ALBANY SOUND” as a master.

From the investigation, Capt. Su have not been to the area, and the planning line is made by him. Capt. Su was sleeping in his bedroom when the accident happened.

### **2.2.2 Background of the 2<sup>nd</sup> officer**

Name: Zhongyang Yu      Age: 27

He graduated from Dalian Maritime School in 1998, and began to worked as the 2<sup>nd</sup> officer on MV “ALBANY SOUND” on Jan. 21<sup>st</sup> in 2004. From the investigation, the 2<sup>nd</sup> officer had not been to the area.

### **2.2.3 The AB**

Name: Ligang Feng              Age: 26

Ligang Feng has three years of experience on the sea as a sailor. On Sep. 30<sup>th</sup> in 2003, he began to work on “ALBANY SOUND” as an ableman.

### **2.2.4 Fitness for Duty**

Yu Zhongyang began to work on “ALBANY SOUND” as a 2<sup>nd</sup> officer on Jan. 21<sup>st</sup> in 2004. On the day of the collision happened, at about 1150, the 2<sup>nd</sup> officer came to the bridge to be on duty with a sailor, then the Capt. Left the

bridge. From Sep. 22<sup>nd</sup> in 2001 to Apr. 10<sup>th</sup> in 2003, the 2<sup>nd</sup> officer worked as a 3<sup>rd</sup> officer on a vessel, the GT of which 12872 and power 5737.5 kw.

### **3 Environmental conditions**

Weather: shine

Wind dir.: N'

Visibility: 10 NM

Sea: slight

Tide: ebb

Wind force: 4

### **4. Narrative**

At about 1015 on Sep. the 30<sup>th</sup> in 2004, MV “ALBANY SOUND” left Beilun Port, in Ningbo, for Haihua ShipYard, a sub-department of Shanghai ShipYard, with fore draft 3.05 meters, and 5.85 meters after.

At about 1120, the pilot from Ningbo pilot station disembarked the vessel.

At about 1130, course 180 degrees, speed 15 knts.

At about 1150, the 2<sup>nd</sup> officer came to the bridge and then was on duty instead of the 3<sup>rd</sup> officer.

At about 1250, the ship's position was 30°20'N,121°48'E. Then the Capt. left the bridge, and the 2<sup>nd</sup> officer and a sailor were on duty. The vessel sailed on the planning line, with the AIS and ARPA radar on starboard switched on, and 2 VHF on CH16 and CH19 respectively.

At about 1345, the ship's position was 30°33'.2N,121°50'.7'E, with course 023 degrees and speed 15.3 knts, 9 to 10 nautical miles away from the East Sea Bridge. The visibility was about 10 nautical miles. Suddenly the sailor found the East Sea Bridge and told the 2<sup>nd</sup> officer, but the 2<sup>nd</sup> officer was sure that it

was the East Sea Bridge, so he just changed the auto-steering to manual. When it's about 6 to 7 miles away from the East Sea Bridge, the officer found some panels were on the piers, and thought that where there were panels on piers was the navigational areas, then navigated the vessel without any changes.

At about 1405, only about 3 miles away from the East Sea Bridge, the officer found there were some piers above the water, and thought that the vessel could pass through them because the distance between the piers was about 40 to 50 meters, more than the breadth of the vessel, 27.2 meters. Then the vessel went on sailing with speed 15 knts and course 050 degrees. The officer and the sailor hadn't found any of the cautionary light buoys, fitted on both sides of the bridge.

At about 1409, when the vessel was about 2 miles away from the bridge, the officer decided to pass by from the right side of pier PM402, so changed the course to 045 degrees, then to 040 degrees,.

At about 1419, the officer found the vessel was in the risk of colliding with the bridge, because the vessel was not in proper position because of the affection the wind and current. Then he gave an order port 25, and when the vessel's bow was between the piers, another order hard a starboard was given.

At about 1420, the second hatch of the starboard side collided with pier PM402-A, and then with pier PM401-B before her passing through the bridge. One minute later, the 2nd officer told the Capt. the accident and ordered standing by engine. When the Capt. came to the bridge, he ordered to check the damage to the vessel(seeing Pic. 2). When found there's no break on the vessel the Capt. ordered to go on sailing and reported the accident to Shanghai MSA at about 1610.

At about 1800 on October the 1<sup>st</sup>, MV "ALBANY SOUND" arrived at Haihua Ship Yard, a sub-department of Shanghai Ship Yard.




Picture 1 Damage to PM402-A    Picture 2 Damage to MV “ALBANY SOUND”

## 5. Analysis

After the accident, the investigators from Shanghai MSA embarked the vessel two times, but to find nothing of the ship herself unfit for sailing.

When the accident happening, the weather condition was as follows:

The investigators also found that the charts, MV “ALBANY SOUND” using, was admiralty charts, and the 2nd officer had not corrected them timely and completely(seeing Pic. 3).



Picture 3 the chart used by “ALBANY SOUND”

### **5.1 The Captain Made a Wrong Design of the Sailing Plan**

The investigation showed that the Capt. had not read the charts and the navigational notices and navigational warnings about East Sea Bridge construction though he and the 2<sup>nd</sup> officer both knew that the bridge was under constructing, so he made a wrong sailing line to cross the bridge.

### **5.2 Crossing the Bridge Disobeying the Regulations Concerned**

The concerned navigational notices No. Huhaihang[2004]300、 Chinese navigational warnings No. SH04283 and English navigational warnings No. SH0439, about the construction of East Sea Bridge, made distinct traffic control provisions that no vessel was permitted to cross the bridge during the construction of the main navigational hole of the bridge. But “ALBANY SOUND” crossed the bridge without obeying the above navigational notices

and warnings concerned, then caused the collision.

### **5.3 Keeping a Negligent Look-out**

The duty officer had not found any of the cautionary light-buoys, and found the light buoys in the east of the bridge until the collision happened.

### **5.4 The 2nd Officer Navigated Without Necessary Caution**

The vessel navigated with high speed of 15.3 knts when she arrived in the bridge area. They had not stopped the engine or turned around, but thought that where there was fitted with panels was navigational waters when they found some of the piers were fitted with panels. When they found it was about 40 to 50 meters between the two piers above the water, they thought the vessel could cross the bridge safely, and had not used all available means appropriate to the prevailing circumstances and conditions, including reporting to the master, to determine whether risk existed. When they recognized the risk of collision, they did not reduce the speed, but altered the course with large steering order times and again to adjust the position. Finally the vessel collided the bridge with high speed because of wrongly manoeuvring.

## **6. Recommendations**

As very important navigational tools, the Capt. should prepare the proper charts and correct them in time according to the newest materials, including navigational notices, navigational warnings and notices to mariners, so as to make sure the safety of navigation. The authority should regard equipping with the proper chart and the correction of the charts as necessary check, and strength the checking of safety especially to those vessels with convenient flag.

The management company and the masters know clearly whether the

seamen eligible and their abilities met the requirement and the SMS based on the ISM code. So the management companies should pay more attention to the training and examination of the seamen to make sure each one eligible and do not dispatch those who can not met the requirement for duty.

The duty officers in the traffic control center should enhance their responsibilities and skill level, and offer the vessel safety information.

East Sea Bridge Construction and Management Company should settle to build the defense facilities.